Is the analysis of the concept of law a(n) (im)modest conceptual analysis?

Abstrakt (całość)

This paper aims to inquire whether an analysis of the concept of law is an exercise of analysis in its modest or immodest form. Our inquiry suggests that the Jacksonian distinction between modest and immodest conceptual analysis, so eagerly applied by many legal scholars, is inapplicable to analyzing a specific part of the concept of law. The crux of our argument lies in the relation between the folk theory of law and the content of the developed concept of law. As an artifact concept, the concept of law must depend on the pre-existing content of the folk conception of law (which we term the ‘foundational folk theory’). This part of folk theory determines the collective intentionality necessary to bring an institutional artifact, such as law, into existence. A large part of the argument for this conclusion depends on the acceptance of a realist and functional, post-Searlean theory of artifactual types.

Link do artykułu

Adam Dyrda & Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki (2022) Is the analysis of the concept of law a(n) (im)modest conceptual analysis?, Jurisprudence, DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2022.2051361*

Więcej publikacji prof. Tomasza Gizbert-Studnickiego: RUJ

Więcej publikacji prof. Adama Dyrdy: RUJ

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